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Observations on the Defi nition of Public Policy 
(Ordre Public) in Swiss Arbitration Law
Motto: „Ein Schiedsgericht thront nicht 
über der Erde, schwebt nicht in der Luft, 
es muss irgendwo landen, 
irgendwo erden.” (Raape) 
Abstract. This study deals with the notion of public policy (ordre public) in Swiss international arbitration. The 
paper analyzes the relevant paragraphs of IPRG, the Swiss Act on Private International Law. Based on legal 
authorities one can read about the distinction between procedural and substantive public policy in Swiss law. The 
paper describes several cases, in which the awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (Tribunal Arbitral du 
Sport) were challenged at the Federal Tribunal of Switzerland based on the alleged breach of public policy. The 
author discusses the question whether there can be a supra-national, universal interpretation of the notion of public 
policy in Swiss law, which is based on the fundamental legal and moral values of the civilized nations.
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It is a well-known fact that one of the main advantages of arbitral dispute resolution is 
speed, expedition, the single instance nature of the procedure and the exclusion of an 
appeal, as a result only the challenge of the arbitral award may be initiated, exclusively 
under special conditions.1 In many cases the arbitral award may bring signifi cant drawbacks 
for the unsuccessful party, which makes it likely that one may want to seize every 
opportunity in order to initiate the challenge of the arbitral award.2
One of the possible ways to challenge an arbitral award is on the grounds of public 
policy.3 In the present study we wish to examine how the Swiss arbitration law defi nes, 
interprets the defi nition of public policy, and what positions have been developed by the 
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1 For this see Gellért, Gy.: Új törvény a választottbíráskodásról (New Law on Arbitration). 
Magyar Jog, 45 (1995), 451–452; Boóc, Á.–Hegyi, A.–Sándor, I.–Szűcs, B.–Török, G.: A követelések 
érvényesítésének jogi eszközei (The legal means of enforcing claims). Budapest, 2005. 260; Boóc, Á.: 
A kereskedelmi választottbíráskodás egyes kérdései (Certain dilemmas of commercial arbitration). In 
Balogh, M.: Diszciplinák határain innen és túl. Fiatal Kutatók Fóruma 2. (Beyond and above the 
borders of Disciplines. Forum of Young Researchers 2). Budapest, 2007. 111–112. 
2 In relation to the invalidation of an arbitration verdict, Hungarian language summary, see 
Horváth, É.–Kálmán, Gy.: A nemzetközi eljárások joga, különös tekintettel a választottbíráskodásra 
(The procedures of international law, particularly with regard to arbitration). Budapest, 2003. 121–126. 
3 For this summary see Kiss, K.: A Választottbíróság ítéletének érvénytelenítése közrendbe 
ütközésre való hivatkozással. A hazai és a nemzetközi gyakorlat összehasonlítása (The invalidation of 
the arbitral tribunal judgments with reference to public policy confl ict. A comparison of domestic and 
international law). Gazdaság és Jog, 13 (2005), 10–14. 
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judicature in connection with this notion. As is well known, Switzerland is a popular venue 
for international arbitration procedures, which can be explained by numerous historical and 
legal historical reasons.4 In light of this the explanation of the defi nition of public policy is 
likely to result as useful experience for both domestic and international arbitration.
Our investigation in the present study shall be limiting its review to how the Swiss law 
on international commercial arbitration proceedings makes it possible for the arbitral award 
to be revoked on the legal basis of collision with public policy.5 Apart from this−briefl y−
refer to the international private law interpretation of public policy in Swiss law.6
I.
It signifi es the intense relationship between the Swiss international arbitration and the Swiss 
international private law that the basic rules applying to them are found in the same statute 
accepted on 18 December 1987 Federal Statute on Swiss international private law 
(Bundesgesetz über das internationale Privatrecht vom 18. Dezember 1987, hereinafter 
referred to as: IPRG). International commercial arbitration rules can be found in the 20th 
chapter of the IPRG. With reference to the work of French Yves Derains on the correlation 
of applicable law during public policy and arbitration process, it is important to highlight 
that throughout international commerce certain collision problems may arise during the 
arbitration procedure, therefore the rules of international private law may play an important 
role in arbitration procedures.7 
It is essential to stress that the current form of the IPRG is a result of an approximately 
ten-year long process, after review of many drafts and amendments.8
The IPRG−neither in the private international law or international commercial 
arbitration part−does not defi ne the concept of public policy, leaving it to a large extent to 
jurisprudence or case law to determine. In Arts 17, 18 and 19 of the IPRG we shall see the 
concept of public policy accepted in international private law, whereas in Art. 190 Para. 2 e) 
it is used as a phrase for grounds of revoking the arbitral award.
4 Swiss arbitration law in Hungarian language summary, see Boóc, Á.: Nemzetközi kereskedelmi 
választottbíráskodás. A választottbíró megválasztása és kizárása (The international commercial 
arbitration. The voting and exclusion of a judge). Budapest, 2009. 51–60. For the development of 
Swiss private law see Hamza, G.: Entstehung und Entwicklung der modernen Privatrechtsordnungen 
und die römischrechtliche Tradition. Budapest, 2009. 236–256. 
5 With regard to the Swiss national arbitration–which is primarily ruled by the accepted 
intercantonal convention on 27th of August 1969, named Interkantonale Konkordat vom 27. März 
1969 über die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit–we do not address. In relation to the Intercantonal Convention 
in detail see Bratschi, P.–Briner, R.: Bemerkungen zum Konkordat über die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit. 
Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung, 72 (1976), 101.
6 The public policy in private international law and arbitration proceedings established the 
concept of the new Hungarian literature summary see: Burián, L.: Gondolatok a közrend szerepéről 
(Thoughts on the function of public order). In: Kiss, D.–Varga, I. (eds): Magister artis boni et aequi. 
Studia in Honorem Németh János. Budapest, 2003. 99–122. 
7 See Derains, Y.: Public Policy and the Law Applicable to the Dispute in International 
Arbitration. In: Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration. ICCA Congress 
Series, No. 3. New York, 1986. 227–256. 
8 For this in detail see Blessing, M.: Introduction to Arbitration−Swiss and International 
Perspectives. Basel, 1999. 170–180. 
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Article 17 of the IPRG states that the application of foreign law is excluded if it would 
lead to the outcome of incompatibility with Swiss public policy (ordre public).9 According 
to the provisions of Art. 18, the provisions of Swiss law must be applied in case specifi c 
goals make it necessary, regardless of the fact that the rules of the IPRG would impose the 
application of other laws, therefore here the present Article is capable of overwriting the 
law-prescribing function of collision laws. Art. 19 provides that provisions of another act 
may be considered if according to the Swiss legal mentality a party deserves to be protected 
and his clear interest requires so, provided that the case is closely linked to another legal 
fi eld. 
These provisions are primarily considering the meaning and functions of public policy 
from the viewpoint of international private law, but- as it will be shown in detail later on–
are in close relation with the meaning of public policy that relates to the invalidation of 
arbitral awards. In connection with this we must refer to Art. 190 of the IPRG, which 
contains the rules for revoking of the arbitral award and which−having regard to our topic−
it seems appropriate to quote verbatim:
Art. 190. IX. Endgültigkeit, Anfechtung
1. Grundsatz
1. Mit der Eröffnung ist der Entscheid endgültig.
2. Der Entscheid kann nur angefochten werden:
a.  wenn der Einzelschiedsrichter vorschriftswidrig ernannt oder das Schiedsgericht 
vorschriftswidrig zusammengesetzt wurde;
b.  wenn sich das Schiedsgericht zu Unrecht für zuständig oder unzuständig erklärt 
hat;
c.  wenn das Schiedsgericht über Streitpunkte entschieden hat, die ihm nicht unterbreitet 
wurden oder wenn es Rechtsbegehren unbeurteilt gelassen hat;
d.  wenn der Grundsatz der Gleichbehandlung der Parteien oder der Grundsatz des 
rechtlichen Gehörs verletzt wurde;
e. wenn der Entscheid mit dem Ordre public unvereinbar ist.
3.  Vorentscheide können nur aus den in Absatz 2, Buchstaben a und b genannten 
Gründen angefochten werden; die Beschwerdefrist beginnt mit der Zustellung des 
Vorentscheides.
According to Art. 190 of the IPRG the enactment of the arbitral award shall be of 
legally binding and fi nal. The arbitral award may be invalidated in the event of:
a) if the single judge or the selection of the arbitration panel was not drawn up 
according to the applicable rules;
b) if the tribunal was mistaken in fi nding it’s jurisdiction or the refusal of it’s 
jurisdiction;
9 „Die Abwendung von Bestimmungen eines ausländischen Rechts ist ausgeschlossen, wenn sie 
zu einem Ergebnis führen würde, das mit dem schweizerischen Ordre public vereinbar ist.” This 
Clause shows similarity with The Hungarian International Private Law Codex, Decree Law 13 of 
1979 like force Clause 7. subpara. 1. In connection with this see Burián, L.–Kecskés, L.–Vörös, I.: 
Magyar nemzetközi kollíziós magánjog (Hungarian International Private Law). Budapest, 1997. 137–
143.
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c) if the content of the tribunal’s award went beyond the request provided, or failed to 
decide on issues that were included in the application;
d) if the principle of equal treatment of parties, or the principle of hearing of the Parties 
was injured;
e) where the award of the tribunal was incompatible with public policy (in German 
and French text: ordre public, the Italian text: ordine pubblico).
It is essential to note that the invalidation of the interim arbitral award may only be 
applied for in the case of a) and b) cited above. In case of Art. 191 the Swiss Federal Court 
(Schweizerische Bundesgericht) is competent to invalidate a foreign arbitral award. There is 
a 30-day long deadline for the submitting of the invalidation petition starting on the day of 
the conveyance of the award. In the international arbitration proceedings, the arbitration 
award may be considered conveyed if it has been delivered to the parties, except if the 
given arbitration rules require otherwise. However, in the Swiss domestic arbitration 
proceedings–unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties–the arbitration award shall be 
deposited with the competent court according to the seat of the arbitration court, which will 
notify the parties of the award.10
Although this study does not deal with the Swiss domestic arbitration, it is essential to 
emphasize that the Swiss domestic arbitration unlike the international commercial 
arbitration provides further opportunities to invalidate the arbitration award since 
invalidation is possible to be sought on the grounds that the award is arbitrary, based on 
obviously incorrect facts or on the clear breach of the law.11
II.
The details of the IPRG that are found in separate places in relation to public policy are in 
close contact with each other in case we examine the role of public policy played in the 
arbitration proceedings. Although Art. 190 of the IPRG mentions confl ict with public policy, 
in relations with the revoking of the arbitration award and the New York Convention on the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards signed on the 10th of June 1958 (The 
New York Convention) mentions public policy in the second paragraph of subparagraph b) 
of the V. Article in relation with the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award, the 
concept of public policy–as it is also pointed out by Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel–starts long 
before the arbitration proceedings begin, for example, because it serves as a limit of the 
parties self autonomy to which cases are judged via arbitration, and therefore the lack of 
settling disputes via arbitration (lack of arbitrability) can often play a large role in the 
public policy clause.12
10 See Segesser, G. V.–Jolles, A.: Switzerland. In: Rowley, J. W.–Mendelsohn, Mc. B. (eds): 
Arbitration World. Jurisdictional Comparisons. London, 20062. 372.
11 Article 33 of the Intercantonal Convention pays attention to the question of invalidation of a 
domestic arbitration award. The comparison of this with international arbitration proceedings see in 
specifi c Walter, G.–Bosch, W.–Brönnimann, J.: Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz. 
Kommentar zu Kapitel 12 des IPR-Gesetzes. Bern, 1991. 225.
12 See Böckstiegel, K. H.: Public Policy as a Limit to Arbitration and its Enforcement. In: IBA 
Journal of Dispute Resolution. Special Issue, 2008. The New York Convention–50 years. 123.
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(Taking account of public policy–and the international private law meaning ascribed to 
it–during the arbitration process is of the utmost importance, because failure to provide it 
may serve as a very good argument that the substantive part of the award shall be invalidated 
by reference to a confl ict with public policy.)
The established view in the case law is that this is an exceptional provision to be used, 
which may be relevant in cases where the violation of law and justice exceeds a level, 
which is contrary to law in its Swiss concept. 
For example, the negative public policy clause contained in Art. 17 of the IPRG shall 
not prevent the application of Saudi Arabian law, which prohibits the imposition of 
interest.13
It is essential to point out–as Francesco Tezzini does–that while the Art. 17 of the 
IPRG uses the concept of Swiss public policy (schweizerische Ordre public) while reading 
the concept of public policy contained in Art. 190 of the IPRG on invalidation of arbitration 
awards we come across “merely” the concept of public policy without any reference to 
Switzerland.14 This will have particular importance during the interpretation of Art. 190 
Para. 2 e) of the IPRG.
By contrast Arts 18 and 19 of the IPRG shall be considered as a kind of positive public 
policy clause, since in this case we can fi nd an essential a public policy interest that requires 
a particular application of the law, as opposed to the public policy exclusion clause in Art. 
17 of the IPRG. This is particularly important in the Swiss case law in case of the application 
of prevailing legal standards of a state are cogent. In the case of Switzerland, this clearly 
occurs in cases where any of the European Community law would be applied.
The Swiss Federal Court in a famous decision made in the Gamma vs SA. Sigma SA 
case on the 28th of 1992 defi ned important criteria in this issue. In this case, the parties 
stipulated Belgian law ruling in their contract and by that included European Community 
antitrust laws as they are a part of Belgian law. The Federal Court held that it would be a 
violation of public policy of the European Community if an arbitration award would be 
inconsistent with Art. 81 (ex-Art. 85) of the Treaty of Rome. Accordingly it is an obligation 
of the arbitrators to examine the agreements before them in order to avoid the decisions 
made that are incompatible with community law.15 The position established in this case by 
the Federal Court has been further refi ned in a decision made on the 13th of November 
1998. According to the facts of the case the parties entered into a licensing agreement, in 
which Swiss law was governing, but under the contract some of the deliverables were to be 
accomplished in the territory of the European Community. 
During the arbitration proceedings neither party referred to a possible breach of the 
EU’s competition rules–Art. 81 of the Treaty of Rome–the arbitrators themselves did not 
investigate this aspect of the matter. The Federal Court held that it is an obligation of the 
arbitrators to examine the contract under Art. 81 of the Treaty of Rome–even if the parties 
deemed Swiss law governing–in case when at least one of the parties referred to the contract 
13 See Vischer, F.: IPRG Kommentar. (Heini, A.–Keller, M.–Siehr, K.–Vischer, F.–Volken, P. 
eds), Zürich, 1993. Art. 17, N. 1, 7.
14 See Trezzini, F.: The Challenge of Arbitral Awards for Breach of Public Policy according to 
Art. 190 para. 2 lit e) of the Swiss Private International Law. In: Three Essays on International 
Commercial Arbitration. Lugano, 2003. 127.
15 See: DFT 118. II. 193. In relation with the decision see Trezzini: op. cit. 135–136. See further 
Blessing: op. cit. 247–248.
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being invalid during the judicial or arbitral proceedings.16 According to this perception in 
case if the arbitrators cannot do that, then the decision may be invalidated based on Art. 190 
Para. 2 e) of the IPRG, according to which the tribunal erred in fi nding or denying 
jurisdiction. A specifi c trait of this decision is that such a strong standpoint wad drawn up 
by the supreme court of a non-EU member state.
The interpretation of the above-quoted Arts 17 and 18 of the IPRG was raised in the 
Federal Court decision made in Lausanne on the 28th of March 2001, too. Here, the 
question was whether a treaty condemning the Swiss law governing, that breaches foreign 
mandatory rules−the UN resolution on a weapons embargo in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia−, may be contrary to Art. 20 of the Swiss OR on good faith.17 The decision held 
the contract was in breach of good faith, but by no means by the direct application of the 
UN resolution, but by the breach of public policy. As you can see, that in this decision Arts 
17 to 19 and Art. 190 Para. 2 e) of the IPRG are jointly applied. 
III.
The following is an overview of the interpretation which the Swiss arbitration practice has 
developed of Art. 190 Para. 2 e) of of the IPRG that is the basis on which the invalidation 
of an arbitration award may be claimed if the judgment is contrary to public policy. With 
regard to the fact that this provision−as it has been mentioned previously−concerns 
international commercial arbitration, it is essential to compare this rule with the New York 
Convention cited above, of which subparagraph Art. V. paragraph 2 b) states the following:
2. The recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award may also be refused if the 
competent authorities of the country in which recognition and enforcement is sought fi nds 
that: b) The recognition or enforcement would be contrary to public policy in this country.18
In comparison of the provisions of the New York Convention and the IPRG, a striking 
difference is that the IPRG makes the invalidation of the award possible if it is contrary to 
public policy while the New York Convention allows the invalidation of the award on the 
grounds of it being contrary to the public policy of the state recognizing and implementing 
the award.19 The question is instantly raised what the difference is between the concept of a 
country’s public policy and the international concept of public policy.
16 See DFT 13.11.1998. See further Trezzini: op. cit. 138. Trezzini emphasizes that according to 
some authors the members of the tribunal should take into consideration Art. 81 of the Treaty of 
Rome if neither party referred to the cases relations with competition law. See further Blessing: op. 
cit. 247–248.
17 The fi rst paragraph of Art. 20 of the Swiss OR defi nes the breach of good faith by contracts as 
such: „Ein Vertrag, der einen unmöglichen oder widerrechtlichen Inhalt hat oder gegen die guten 
Sitten verstösst, ist nichtig.”
18 The New York convention was implemented into Hungarian law by Decree–Law No. 
25/1962.
19 It is an important part of the cited article of the New York Convention that recognition for 
states is not compulsory and that the question of denial of enforcement on grounds of violation of 
public policy is at the discretion of the court.
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Although the wording of the New York Convention is clear about the public order of 
the country given, due to the international nature of the arbitration proceeding it−the 
concept of international aspects of the subject−makes it essential to be aware of the 
international aspects of public policy.20 In some countries the case law also places great 
emphasis on the investigation of this issue. The manual of Martin Hunter-Alan Redfern 
refers to a specifi c case in India. The Supreme Court of India in the case of Renusagar 
Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. made the following stance:
“This raises the question of whether the narrower concept of public policy as 
applicable in the fi eld of public international law should be applied or the wider concept of 
public policy as applicable in the fi eld of municipal law. The Court held that the narrower 
view should prevail and that enforcement would be refused on the public policy ground if 
such enforcement would be contrary to (i) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (ii) the 
interests of India;or (iii) justice or morality.”21
According to the Supreme Court of India a narrower concept of public policy should 
be applied when the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards are concerned, but 
throughout the detailed discussion of this matter explains that the recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitration award on the grounds of it being contrary to public policy 
may be possible if it is contrary to the fundamental policy, the interests of India, or the 
concept of morality and justice. As one might see this public policy clause has a somewhat 
broader interpretation than the concept of international public policy due to the position 
held by the Supreme Court of India.
In Swiss case law in Art. 190 Para. 2 e) of the IPRG the substantive law meaning and 
the procedural law meaning of public policy is clearly distinguishable. The essence of the 
procedural law public policy is that each party should be granted the right to an irrespective 
judgment that is an appropriate procedure, the adequate portrayal and evaluation of facts. 
The substantive law public policy means fi rstly the fundamental principles of the rule of 
law, the intrinsic values which all arbitration awards must respect.
During the interpretation of the procedural public policy several notable cases can be 
found in the Swiss case law. It was held that the mere fact that an arbitration award has no 
justifi cation is not a procedural violation of public policy. In reference to the independence 
of the experts used by the tribunal independence, used by experts for the Swiss Federal 
Court has thus held a position that, until an expert has no personal interest in the outcome 
of a legal proceedings there can be no talk about violations of public order.22
The Swiss Federal Court came to a very interesting conclusion in relation to the 
procedural public policy in another case. In the event that the tribunal gives an opportunity 
for certain facts to be considered as evidence, but later on lets the parties know that these 
facts were not portrayed in an appropriate way (and therefore will not consider them), we 
may talk about the violation of procedural public policy. However, if the tribunal gives the 
20 In relation to this see Carbonneau, T. E.: Alternative Dispute Resolution. Melting the Lances 
and Dismounting the Steeds. Chicago, 1989. 66–67. 
21 The case of Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. was quoted by Redfern, A.–
Hunter, M.: Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration. London, 20044. 473. 
22 In connection with this see Müller, Ch.: International Arbitration. A Guide to the Complete 
Swiss Case Law (Unreported and Reported). Zürich–Basel–Geneva, 2004. 180–181. 
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authorization for the attachment of such evidence, then later on−the Federal Court ruled 
that–without the breach of good faith without prejudice to its decision may not arbitrarily 
change it. The Federal Court also points out that by doing so the tribunal violates the 
contractual legal relationship existant between the tribunal and the parties and that is 
contrary to the theory pacta sunt servanda.23 
In my opinion, this case is very interesting in two respects. Firstly, the argument 
mentioned above is good at relating the concept of procedural and substantive public policy 
also highlighting the fact that there is a kind of contractual relationship between the parties, 
because the parties subjected themselves to the tribunal’s decision, instructed the tribunal to 
make a judgment in the matter and due to this analogy the tribunal also bares certain 
obligations.24
As far as the substantive public policy concept is considered, here the acting tribunal–
that is the Swiss Federal Court–is responsible for considering for specifi c matters whether 
there has been a secondary offense, which is contrary to the fundamental principle of the 
rule of law. 
Based on the available case law of the pacta sunt servanda principle, a serious 
violation of the principle of good faith, the prohibition of the abuse of power, that is in fact 
the violation of a principle with an apparently signifi cant moral content of private 
international law may justify the violation of public policy from the substantive point of 
view. 
The Federal Court in a case held that it may be viewed as the violation of good faith 
with particular attention to the violation of culpa in contrahendo–and shall therefore be 
considered as basis for the invalidation of an arbitration award for the violation of public 
policy–if either party during the contracting process fails to provide all necessary 
information that the other party did not know about and could not have known about that 
was needed for the other party to make an informed decision.25 The view of the Federal 
Court is of fundemental importance that the violation of good faith and the abuse of power 
materialised so that the arbitration award may be invalidated on the grounds of it being 
contrary to public policy shall be examined via the second article of the Swiss OR.26
23 In connection with this see Müller: op. cit. 190.
24 It seems appropriate to refer to the fact that this quality of modern day arbitration shows 
much relation to the concept of arbitration in Roman Law, where the receptum arbitrii known as 
pactum also emphasizes the contractual nature of the legal relationship. For the concept of receptum 
arbitrii see Földi, A.–Hamza, G.: A római jog története és institúciói (The History and Institutions of 
Roman Law). Budapest, 200913. 542. For the arbitration in Rome see Roebuck, D.–De Loynes de 
Fumichon, B.: Roman Arbitration. Oxford, 2004. For the legal nature of the arbitration contract see 
Ujlaki, L.: A választottbírósági szerződés jogági elhelyezettsége és tipológiája (The legal position and 
typology of the arbitration agreement). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 46 (1991), 216–225. 
25 See Müller: op. cit. 191.
26 Article 2 of the OR points out that „Haben sich die Parteien über alle wesentlichen Punkte 
geeinigt, so wird vermutet, dass der Vorbehalt von Nebenpunkten die Verbindlichkeit des Vertrages 
nicht hindern solle. Kommt über die vorbehaltenen Nebenpunkte eine Vereinbarung nicht zustande, so 
hat der Richter über diese nach der Natur des Geschäftes zu entscheiden. Vorbehalten bleiben die 
Bestimmungen über die Form der Verträge.”
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Therefore the good faith procedure demanded at the creation of contractual obligation 
prescribed by Swiss private law acts as a canon during the invalidation process of an 
arbitration award on the grounds of it being contrary to public policy.27
IV.
In Swiss case law/practice the Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS (Tribunal Arbitral du 
Sport) plays a unique role in the viewpoint evolved in relation to the invalidation of an 
award on the grounds of collision with public policy. The CAS was founded by the 
International Olympic Association. The CAS is based in Lausanne it is an arbitrary 
institution judging cases involving international legal matters under Swiss law.28
Numerous requests for the invalidation of the decision on the grounds of it being 
contrary to Swiss public policy made by the CAS have been submitted to the Federal Court 
also based in Lausanne. The Federal Court has rejected all requests based on the decision 
being in confl ict with substantive public policy.29 The Federal Court in sports-law cases 
held that the concept of confl ict with public policy shall be viewed as an international 
concept rather then a domestic one, which in essence prohibits the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments that are incompatible with fundamental legal or moral principles 
established in civilized countries. 
In the case of Marc Biolley v. Association Turkish FA in 2007 the Federal Court held 
that an award is contrary to substantive public policy if it breaches such fundamental rules 
of substantive law that by doing so it becomes incompatible with the present rule of law 
and system of values. In the interpretation of the Federal Court such is the prohibition of 
the abuse of law and what is even more substantial in sports law questions the prohibition 
of discriminating provisions and the protection of incapacitated persons.
Several requests for invalidation have been submitted against rulings by the CAS of 
the grounds of them being contrary to the principle of good faith and the equal treatment 
and are therefore contrary to Swiss public policy.
It is worth referring to the case of Raducan v. IOC in the year 2000 Sydney Olympic 
Games, acting under the CAS ad hoc arbitration tribunal found that Romanian female 
gymnast, Andreea Raducan, who had admittedly taken a pill containing a banned ingredient 
had commited a doping violation. Andreea Ruducan later on based her request for 
invalidation on the fact that there was an inexplicable difference in the quantity of the urine 
sample provided by her during the doping test (100 ml) and the urine sample examined by 
the laboratory (62 ml) and due to this the arbitration body should not have judged the claim 
27 In connection with good faith in Swiss law see Földi, A.: A jóhiszeműség és tisztesség elve. 
Intézménytörténeti vázlat a római jogtól napjainkig (The principle of good faith and honesty). History 
of Institution from Roman times till today). Budapest, 2001. 48–52. The second Article of the ZGB 
for the concept of good faith uses the expressions Treu und Glauben, bonne foi, and buona fede.
28 The quite informative website of the CAS is: http://www.tas-cas.org/ In connection with the 
functions of the arbitration besides the regulation and certain decision on the website see in detail 
Blackshaw, I. S.−Siekmann, R. C. R.−Soek, J. (eds): The Court of Arbitration for Sport: 1984–2004. 
The Hague, 2006.
29 In connection with this see Mitten, M. J.: Judicial Review of Olympic and International 
Sports Arbitration Awards: Trends and Observations. Marquette University Law School Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, (2009) 9–14, 9. see http://ssrn.com/abstract=1376317. 
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as it has done previously in another case where the integrity of the urine sample was not 
suffi ciently justifi ed the examined sports fellow was not condemned and according to the 
Romanian gymnast her conviction was violation of the principle of equal treatment. 
According to the Federal Court that fact that Andreea Raducan made a statement 
during the process that resulted in her admitting to taking the pill containing a banned 
ingredient makes this case completely different to the one referred to in the request for 
invalidation and therefore we may not speak of the violation of equal treatment.30
From the point of view of our topic it is even more interesting to take into account the 
fact whether the seat of the CAS arbitration is always seen as Lausanne–regardless of where 
geographically speaking the Arbitration Board’s proceedings are actually conducted–and 
whether the procedure is governed by Swiss law. Thus the CAS arbitral judgments–except 
in Switzerland–may be viewed as a foreign arbitration award, which in case of recognition 
and enforcement of judgments is to be considered under the public policy clause of the New 
York Convention subpara. e) of Article V.
In the case law of the United States we can experience in several cases that the 
judgment made by the CAS was applied for to be invalidated on the grounds of collision 
with public policy. 
It is worthwhile mentioning the case of Slaney v. International Amateur Athletic 
Federation.31 According to the facts of the case a medium distance runner female sports 
fellow had an increased ratio of testosterone to episterone of 6:1. According to the rules of 
the International Amateur Athletic Federation this increased ratio suggests that the athlete 
was using a banned substance for doping which presumption may be rebutted by the athlete 
submitting clear and convincing evidence, demonstrating that the increase was due to a 
physiological or pathological state. During the process Mary Slaney failed to produce such 
evidence.
Her intention was to invalidate the judgment on the grounds that it is in collision with 
the public policy of the United States of America that the conviction relies on a test which 
is scientifi cally invalid and is discriminative against female athletes. The Second Circuit 
Court of the USA denied her request pointing out that the recognition and enforcement of 
an arbitration award may only be denied on a small scale of the public policy clause of the 
New York Convention. This is only possible in the case of when the judgment would be in 
violation of the fundamental concepts and the enforcement of the judgment would be 
contrary to a paramount principle of law. According to the viewpoint of Second Circuit the 
rules above-mentioned and the procedures for determining may in no way be viewed as one 
that is in accordance with the conditions of the application of the public policy clause.
In connection with this Matthew J. Mitten–in light of the position held by the Swiss 
Federal Court and the courts of the USA–draws the conclusion that the public policy clause 
in connection to the recognition of arbitration awards in connection to the Olympic Games 
and international sports instead of individual national approaches shall be interpreted 
throughout a transnational concepts of universal lex sportiva.  
This approach according to Mitten actually meets the objective set by Judge Pierre 
Coubertin which states that it is an important goal for the olympic movement to respect the 
fundamental ethical principles.32
30 In detail see Mitten: op. cit. 11–12.
31 For summary of the case see Mitten: op. cit. 15–16.
32 In connection with this see Mitten: op. cit. 17.
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As a counter example Matthew J. Mitten–and with a critical opinion–refers to a 
judgment made by the European Court in 2006. In the case of Meca-Medina and Majcen v. 
Comm’n of European Communities the European Court of Justice allowed two Slovenian 
swimmers to contest an arbitration award by the CAS.33 The arbitration tribunal in its 
judgment moderated the suspension of doping misdemeanor at the Brazil swimmers world 
cup from four years given by the International Swimmers Association Federation 
Internationale de Natation, FINA) to two years. The European Court of Justice allowed the 
case to be retried with the conditions to view if the two year suspension was proportionate 
in light of the provisions ordering the freedom of competition and services in the Treaty of 
Rome. According to the European Court of Justice these sports law provision by prohibiting 
the swimmers from part-taking in professional swimming and challenges have a distinct 
economic impact on the swimmers and it should be investigated if these doping rules are 
compatible with the above-mentioned principles of the European Community law.
It is of the utmost importance to note that the European Court of Justice found that the 
criteria defi ned in the doping rules are adequate and the sanctions are not disproportionate, 
not excessive, that is not contrary to European Community competition law, but it seems 
that the European Court of Justice in this case appears to have taken into account other 
considerations than just those defi ned in the New York Convention or the Swiss IPRG in 
the decision of invalidating of the CAS arbitration award.
According to Mitten the opinion set out in the above-cited case is unlucky because it 
might result in the suppression of the evolution of cohesive legal interpretation of 
international Olympic games and international sports whereas according to Mitten’s opinion 
the achievement of such an international sports legal system would be salutary in which the 
achievement of a homogenic interpretation of public policy should be achieved.34
V.
In order to understand whether the Swiss case law considers the concept of public policy 
international or transnational it is expedient to refer to a judgment made by the Swiss 
Federal Court in 1995 that the manual of Hunter-Redfern describes in detail.35 According to 
the justifi cation of the judgment during the recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
arbitration award in–when clearly implied that the international aspects of public policy 
must be borne in mind–a Swiss court has a very narrow margin. In view of the Swiss Court 
if the recognition and enforcement should be denied on grounds of a procedural error then 
this is possible only in the case if the procedural error is contrary to the fundamental 
principles of the Swiss jurisdiction or is in serious violation of the sense of justice. 
In another case the Federal Court came to the guiding position that Art. 190 Para. 2 e) 
of the IPRG should be interpreted by taking into consideration of the universal concept of 
public policy which is independent from the dispute and applicable substantive law. 
33 See the whole case at 
  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:224:0008:0008:EN:PDF 
  See the bulletpoints of the case at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/
pdf/2009-02/cp060065en.pdf 
34 In connection with this see Mitten: op. cit. 19. 
35 See Redfern-Hunter: op. cit. 473.
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The violation of public policy is distinguishable if the judgment is contrary to the 
ethical values of the civilized countries, which values are therefore to be valid above at an 
above all nations.36
The above-quoted Trezzini summarizes the respected Professor Pierre Lalive’s opinion 
that invalidation on grounds of the public policy clause has three known levels. Firstly one 
may speak of the domestic public policy concept which arises as a result of national 
provision and may prevail in domestic conditions. Secondly one may mention the Swiss 
public policy which is of national origin but is applied in the international dimension and 
thirdly the supranational and transnational and really may refer to the international public 
policy which is not the product of the national jurisdiction but the public policy concept 
which may be derived from the civilized countries and the perception and attitude of 
international commerce.37 
From those mentioned above the conclusion can be drawn that in the dimension of 
international arbitration the application of the transnational concept of pubic policy is 
salutary. In case of this public policy concept–as it may be seen from the case cited above–
the strict distinction between the concept of substantive and procedural public policy seems 
artifi cial. However, it is important to conclude that when defi ning the concept of 
international public policy covered by sacrosanctus legal values it is almost impossible to 
proceed without the implantation of individual countries, legal cultures and morals. 
36 See Müller: op. cit. 171. 
37 See Trezzini: op. cit. 131. See further Lalive, P.: Ordre Public transnational ou réellement 
international et arbitrage international. Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1986. 329 sqq.
